The attorney representing the town of Scotland Neck is seeking the dismissal with prejudice of a discrimination complaint filed by a former officer.
As of this report there has been no response from the attorney representing the plaintiff — Marcus Morris.
“To survive a motion to dismiss … the complaint must allege enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the motion filed by Katie Weaver Hartzog of the Raleigh-based Hartzog Law Group says. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice … Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
While the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the motion says a pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
In short, the motion says to satisfy the facial plausibility standard and survive “a plaintiff must do more than simply plead facts that hint at the sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. The court does not credit allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”
Hartzog argues that Morris’s independent claims against the town fail as a matter of law and that case law has “well established that there is no freestanding claim against a municipal employer.”
The attorney also argues that Morris’s Title VII claim should be dismissed because he has failed to allege that the town is an employer for purposes of Title VII liability.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. “Title VII defines an employer as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.”
Says the motion, “Plaintiff’s admission establishes that the town employs fewer individuals than Title VII's statutory threshold for employer coverage. As such, the complaint fails to state a claim for Title VII retaliation and plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law.”
The motion also argues that Morris’s claim under the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act fails because the town lacks the requisite number of employees to be held liable and because courts do not recognize standalone claims under this statute. “Even if the plaintiff could demonstrate that the town meets the statutory employee threshold for NCEEPA coverage, his claim would nevertheless fail as a matter of law. North Carolina courts have never found that violation of the NCEEPA creates a private cause of action … Given these dual deficiencies, plaintiff’s standalone NCEEPA claims must be dismissed.”
Charlotte attorney Chance Lynch filed the complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of race, retaliation after complaining about discrimination, racial discrimination prohibited by applicable North Carolina law, and to provide appropriate relief to (the) plaintiff.”
The complaint says that the town subjected Morris, who is Black, “to an unlawful, discriminatory, and hostile work environment perpetuated by and through the town’s agents and employees. Plaintiff alleges that after he complained about discrimination, he was the subject of retaliation by agents of (the) defendant. Plaintiff further alleges that the discriminatory and hostile work environment created by agents of (the) defendant culminated in plaintiff's enduring emotional injuries and professional damages.”
